In this paper, we study and model a crash-recovery target and its failure detector's probabilistic behavior. We extend Quality of Service (QoS) metrics to measure the recovery detection speed and the proportion of the detected failures of a crash-recovery failure detector. Then the impact of the dependability of the crash-recovery target on the QoS bounds for such a crash-recovery failure detector is analysed by adopting general dependability metrics such as MTTF and MTTR. In addition, we analyse how to estimate the failure detector's parameters to achieve the QoS from a requirement based on Chen's NFD-S algorithm. We also demonstrate how to execute the configuration procedure of this crash-recovery failure detector. The simulations are based on the revised NFD-S algorithm with various MTTF and MTTR. The simulation results show that the dependability of a recoverable monitored target could have significant impact on the QoS of such a failure detector and match our analysis results.
Introduction
The Quality of Service of crash failure detection is a widely studied topic [3, 4, 6, 7, 11, 14] . Most of the previous work on this topic is based on the crash-stop or fail-free assumption and focus on how to estimate the probabilistic message arrival time and a suitable timeout length for such failure detectors. In this paper, we investigate and model a crash-recovery target service (CR-TS), which has the ability to recover from the crash state. We assume that the survival time and crash time of such a target follow some probability distribution. We extend the previous QoS metrics [3] to measure the QoS of a crash-recovery failure detection service (FDS) and analyse the QoS bounds for such a FDS. We show how to estimate the FDS's parameters from a given QoS set of requirements and indicate how to estimate the inputs for the FDS's parameters estimation. Our analysis and simulation results show that the crash and recovery of the monitored target will have impact on the QoS of the FDS. For monitoring a recoverable target, especially for the recoverable target with low reliability, our analysis is more realistic and the FDS's parameters estimation is more strict.
Related Work
In [3] Chen et al. proposed a set of QoS metrics to measure the accuracy and speed of a failure detector. Their model contains a pair of processes -the monitor process and the monitored process -and there is only one crash during the monitoring period. The analysis work is based on two distinct stages of failure detection: the pre-crash stage, which is a fail-free run; and the post-crash stage, which is a crash-stop run and terminates the monitoring procedure. In order formally to define the QoS metrics, Chen et al. defined the state transitions of a failure detector monitoring a target process under the fail-free assumption [3] . At any time, the failure detector's state is either trust or suspect with respect to the monitored process's liveness. If a failure detector moves from a trust state to a suspect state then an S-transition occurs; if the failure detector moves from a suspect state to a trust state then a T-transition occurs. Chen et al. define the following QoS metrics for a failure detectors in a crash-stop run in [3] :
Detection time (T D ): the elapsed time from when the monitored process crashes until the monitoring process permanently suspects the monitored process: the final Stransition occurs.
Mistake recurrence time (T MR ): the time between occurrence of the i-th and (i + 1)-th mistakes: S-transition i to S-transition i + 1, where i ≥ 1.
Mistake duration (T M ): the time to correct a mistaken suspect state: S-transition to T-transition.
Query accuracy probability (P A ): the probability that the state information from the failure detector is correct at an arbitrary time: P A = 1 − Additionally in [3] , three push-style algorithms, one for clock synchronized systems (NFD-S) and the other two for clock unsynchronized systems (NFD-U and NFD-E) are defined. The authors show how to estimate the failure detector parameters (heartbeat interval η and shift of freshness point δ 1 ) according to a given QoS specification for each of the above algorithms.
Some recent research has extended the QoS work of [3] in a number of ways. For example, [4, 11, 14] refine the model with different probabilistic message delay and loss estimation methods. Meanwhile, others, such as [5, 6, 7, 13] focus on the scalability and adaptivity of crash failure detection. But all of this work is based on eventual crash-stop behavior of the monitored process or the fail-free assumption.
Crash-recovery failure detectors have been considered by several groups, e.g. [1, 8, 12] . However, each of these papers propose failure detectors to solve consensus or group membership problems rather than focusing on the QoS of the failure detector itself. In [1] , the monitored process is characterised as always-up, eventually-up, eventually-down or unstable. A process which crashes and recovers infinitely many times is regarded as unstable. But crash-recovery looping behavior exists for most systems. From the perspective of stochastic theory, crash-recovery behavior can be regarded as a regenerative process, in which the probabilistic live and recovery time are not zero. For example, a web service system, in which the deployed service might crash but can be recovered by some recovery techniques, such as reboot or restart from the last available checkpoint, can be regarded as a typical crash-recovery system. From the system designer's perspective, the recovery should be as quick as possible. However, from the failure detection perspective, in order to detect the occurrence of such a failure, the failure detector expects that the recovery has a reasonable duration.
In [10] , a preliminary study of the QoS of the crashrecovery failure detector (FDS) is presented. A crashrecovery target service (CR-TS) is modeled as a stochastic process, which can be regarded as an alternating renewal process with the random variable X a (t) presenting the elapsed time from a recovery time to the next crash time and the random variable X c (t) presenting the elapsed time from a crash time to the next recovery time (see Fig 1) . General dependability metrics such as reliability, availability and consistency are adopted to characterize the behaviors of the CR-TS. In [10] , the reliability is captured by the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF), the availability is captured by the Mean Time To Failure over the Mean Time Between Failure ( MTTF MTBF ), the consistency is captured by the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR). Note that E(X a (t)) = MTTF, E(X c (t)) = MTTR and E(X a (t) + X c (t)) = MTBF. In [10] it is concluded that in steady state, observing one MTBF period is enough to capture the crash-recovery failure detection characteristics of a failure detection pair.
QoS of the Crash-Recovery FDS

Analysis of the Crash-Recovery FDS
Let S A ∈ S a represent the accuracy of the FDS's current output value, where S a := {Accurate, Mistake}. Here Accurate means the current FDS's output value presents the CR-TS's current state accurately. Mistake means the FDS's output value presents the CR-TS's current state inaccurately. Let S CR-TS ∈ S represent the current state of the CR-TS, where S :={Alive, Crash}. S FDS-O ∈ S s represents the current output value of the FDS, where S s := {Trust, Suspect} is the state space of the suspicion levels of the FDS. If each of Trust, Alive and Accurate is regarded as True and each of Suspect, Crash, and Mistake as False, the FDS's current accuracy can be derived from the following deduction:
This deduction can be justified by observing the fact that if the value of S FDS-O and S CR-TS are the same then the value of S A is True, because the FDS's output value presents the CR-TS's state accurately. If the value of S FDS-O and S CR-TS are different then the value of S A will be False. Thus the value of S A is the result of an Exclusive-NOR operation between the value of S FDS-O and S CR-TS .
For a fail-free run (MTTF → +∞) or a crash-stop run (MTTR → +∞), the CR-TS's current state S CR-TS is always Alive (for the time up to the crash) and it is easy to deduce the FDS's accuracy S A directly from the FDS's current state S FDS-O . However, for a crash-recovery run, since the CR-TS could fail or recover at arbitrary time, S A cannot be deduced solely from S FDS-O . Therefore, measuring the accuracy of a FDS for a CR-TS is more complex. In addition, compared with a fail-free or crash-stop run, there are more mistake types in a crash-recovery run. In previous work, such as [3, 7, 11, 13, 14] , only the mistakes caused by the message transmission behaviors (message delay and (Fig 2(a) ) represents the duration of a mistake caused by a message delay. T 2 M (Fig 2(b) ) represents the duration of a mistake caused by a message loss. T 3 M (Fig 2(c) ) represents the duration of a mistake caused by CR-TS's crash and T 4 M (Fig 2(d) ) represents the duration of mistakes caused by CR-TS's recovery. Moreover, since the errors that may occur in a crash-recovery run are more complex, the QoS of such systems may exhibit quite different characteristics.
QoS Metrics Extension for the CrashRecovery FDS
For a crash-recovery FDS, in addition to the QoS metrics introduced in [3] (T D , T M , T MR , P A ), we propose some new QoS metrics. In order to measure the speed with which a FDS can discover a recovery of the CR-TS, we define:
Recovery detection time (T DR ): represents the time that elapses from CR-TS's recovery time to the time when the FDS discovers the recovery. If the recovery is not detected, then T DR = +∞.
Since in a crash-recovery run there is no eventual behavior of a CR-TS, a fast recovery could make a failure undetectable by a FDS. Under such circumstances, the completeness property of a failure detector proposed in [2] cannot be always satisfied. In order to reflect this situation, we refine the definition of completeness as follows:
• Strong completeness: every crash failure of a recoverable process will be detected.
• Weak completeness: a proportion of crash failures of recoverable process will be detected, satisfying a specified requirement.
Thus, in order to measure the completeness of a crashrecovery failure detector, we propose another new QoS metric:
Detected failure proportion (R DF ): the ratio of the detected failures over the occurred failures (0 ≤ R DF ≤ 1). When no crash failure is detected, R DF = 0. When all crash failures occurrences are detected, R DF = 1. The strong completeness property of a FDS's requires that E(R DF ) = 1. The weak completeness property requires
DF is the required lower bound on the detected failure proportion and 0 < R L DF < 1. Overall, the QoS for a crash-recovery FDS, can be cap-
The Analysis of the NFD-S Algorithm in a
Crash-Recovery Run
System Model
We consider a distributed system model with two services, one FDS and one CR-TS, distributed over a widearea network. The FDS and the CR-TS are connected by an unreliable communication channel. Liveness messages are transmitted from the CR-TS to the FDS through the channel. The QoS of the communication through a channel can be measured by the average message delay (E(D)), the probability of message loss (p L ) and the average consecutive message loss-length (E(X L (t))) (i.e. the average num-ber of consecutive messages lost). We assume the communication channel will not create or duplicate liveness messages, but the messages might be lost or infinitely delayed during transmission (the same as the probabilistic network model in [3] ). The CR-TS can fail by crashing but can be repaired and restart to run again after some repair time, behaving as a crash-recovery model. The drift of the local clocks of the FDS and the CR-TS are small enough to be ignored and their local clocks are synchronized to be regarded as a clock synchronized system (e.g., using the Network Time Protocol as in [4] ). The failure detection algorithm we adopt is therefore the NFD-S algorithm proposed in [3] .
QoS Bounds Analysis
In [10] , it is shown that in order to study the steady state behavior of a CR-TS throughout its lifetime, we only need to observe the time period between two consecutive regeneration points. Fig. 3 shows the relationship between a FDS and a CR-TS on the interval t ∈ [t 0 , t 3 ), where both t 0 and t 3 are regeneration points. Obviously, the mean time between t 0 and t 3 is MTBF. We split
Here t 0 and t 3 , are the time at which the CR-TS recovers; t 1 is the time when the FDS detects the recovery; t 2 is the time of the next CR-TS's crash. With respect to messages, σ s is the liveness message sending time, i.e. the sending time of the first message received by the FDS after a recovery; σ i is the sending time of a liveness message after σ s before the CR-TS's crash; η is the message sending interval; τ s is the first decision time (the first liveness message receiving time) after recovery; τ d is the failure detection time.
In a crash-recovery run, the state of a CR-TS can switch between Alive and Crash. Let t 2. For any i ≥ 1, let p j (x) be the probability that the FDS does not receive message m i+j by time τ i + x, for every j ≥ 0 and every x ≥ 0; let p 0 = p 0 (0).
3. For any i ≥ 2, let q 0 be the probability that the FDS receives message m i−1 before time τ i .
4
. For any i ≥ 1, let u (x) be the probability that the FDS suspects the CR-TS at time τ i +x, for every x ∈ [0, η).
5. p s : for any i ≥ 2, let p s be the probability that an S-transition occurs at time τ i .
According to the QoS analysis of the NFD-S algorithm in [3] (Proposition 3) , we now analyze the QoS metrics of the NFD-S algorithm in a crash-recovery run and show the following relations hold: Proposition 4.1. Within the period [t 1 , t 2 ) for each MTBF period:
2. for all j ≥ 0 and for all x ≥ 0,
Theorem 4.1. The crash-recovery FDS based on the NFD-S algorithm has the following properties:
If the recovery duration is larger than η + timeout, then
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is based on the analysis of the average number of possible mistakes within the distinct intervals [t 0 , t 1 ), [t 1 , t 2 ) [t 2 , t 3 ), respectively. Since the proof of the whole theorem is long, 2 here we give only a brief sketch of the proof. Even if the FDS always trusts or suspects the CR-TS, due to state changes of the CR-TS within each MTBF period, there will be at least one mistake when the CR-TS crashes or recovers. If the failure can be detected before the recovery, both the crash and the recovery of the CR-TS can generate mistakes. If the FDS has already suspected the CR-TS before it crashes, it means there is at least one mistake caused by message delay or loss. If the FDS trusts the CR-TS before it recovers, it means there is at least one false positive mistake. Thus when the recovery duration is larger than η + timeout, there will be at least two mistakes for each MTBF period.
For the fail-free duration [t 1 , t 2 ), the average number of mistakes can be derived from the fact that if an S-transition occurs then a mistake will happen. Within [t 1 , t 2 ), the average number of mistakes will depend on the number of decision time points (τ i ) and the probability that a valid liveness message is not received by the decision time. From  Fig. 3 , we can see that the average duration of [t 1 , t 2 ) is MTTF − E(T DR ). Thus the average number of τ i is less than MTTF−E(TDR) η + 1. Since according to Proposition 4.1 the probability that the FDS suspects the CR-TS within [t 1 , t 2 ) is p s , then the average number of mistakes within [t 1 , t 2 ) can be estimated as (
MTTF−E(TDR)
η +1)·p s . In addition, after the CR-TS has crashed, on average there are
messages still on the way to the FDS, which might also generate mistakes. Therefore the overall average number of mistakes within each MTBF is less than (
For E(T MR ), inequalities (1) and (2) can be easily derived by using the observation duration (MTBF) divided by the mean number of mistakes within that period. E(T M ) is less than the total mistake duration within the period divided by the minimum number of mistakes within that duration. The average mistake duration within
, which is in the fail-free period, can be estimated using equation (3. 3) of Theorem 5 in
The total mistake duration within [t 1 , t 2 ) can be obtained by using the number of mistakes within this period multiplied by E(T M ). Thus the total mistake duration can be estimated by E(T DR ) +
. The minimum number of mistakes for each MTBF period is (
Therefore inequality (3) can be derived.
P A , the probability that the FDS is accurate, can be derived from the total time that the FDS has an accurate output divided by the total observation period (MTBF). The total time that the FDS is accurate can be estimated using
u (x)dx . Thus the inequality (4) can be obtained.
E(T DR ), is obtained directly from the average consecutive message loss number (E(X L (t))) multiplied by the liveness message sending interval (η), plus the average message delay (E(D)), because, if a failure is detectable, after the recovery, when the first valid liveness message is received by the FDS, the recovery is detected (see Fig. 2(d) ).
E(R DF ) can be estimated using the fact that if the recovery duration is larger than the failure detection time, then the occurred failure can be detected. Thus the proportion of the detectable failures can be estimated using E(R DF ) ≥ P r(X c (t) > η + timeout).
From the above analysis, Theorem 4.1 can be used to estimate the FDS's parameters and QoS bounds. Particularly, when the monitoring target is fail-free, for the QoS metrics in [3] (see inequalities (1)-(4) in Theorem 4.1), we can easily deduce that
u (x)dx. As MTTF → +∞, P r(X a (t) > τ i + x − t m r ) approaches one. Therefore, p s , u (x) and q 0 in the Definition 4.1 are reduced to p s , u(x) and q 0 in the Definition 1 in [3] . Thus E(T MR ), E(T M ) and P A are exactly reduced to the QoS analysis results in [3] . Therefore, we can conclude that in terms of the QoS of failure detection, a fail-free run or a crash-stop run with MTTF → +∞ is a particular case of a crash-recovery run.
Figure 4. The Extended NFD-S Algorithm Configuration
If the monitored target's MTTF is not sufficiently long and the monitored target is recoverable, then the impact of its dependability should be taken into consideration.
The Revised NFD-S Algorithm for the Crash-Recovery FDS
For the NFD-S algorithm in a crash-recovery run, the assumption that the sequence numbers of the heartbeat messages are continually increasing after every recovery of the CR-TS is needed to ensure that the NFD-S algorithm is still valid after each recovery. However, without persistent storage to snapshot the runtime information frequently, when a crash failure occurs, all of the current runtime information might be lost. In such a situation, increasing heartbeat message numbers cannot be guaranteed. In addition, resetting the heartbeat sequence number can indicate the occurrence of a recovery and simplify the parameter computation as well. Since for the NFD-S algorithm, the local clocks of the FDS and the CR-TS are synchronized, we can use the comparison of the sending time of each heartbeat message instead of the comparison of the heartbeat sequence number. Then, for a crash-recovery FDS, given the QoS requirements of the FDS, the configuration procedure is illustrated in Fig. 4 .
For given QoS requirements, expressed as bounds, the following inequalities need to be satisfied:
From Theorem 4.1, we can estimate the parameters (η and timeout) of the NFD-S algorithm according to the following inequalities:
Then, the configuration of the NFD-S algorithm becomes the problem to find the largest η satisfying inequalities (9)- (12) and if such η exists, find the largest timeout that satis-
The configuration procedure can be done in the following steps:
Step I If T L MR < MTBF continue, else the QoS of the FDS cannot be achieved.
Step II Find the largest η that satisfies the inequalities (9)- (12), otherwise cannot find appropriate η.
Step III If η > 0, find the largest
From the above steps, the estimation of η and timeout for a crash-recovery FDS based on the NFD-S algorithm amounts to finding a numerical solution for the inequalities (8)- (13) . This can be done using binary search similarly to [3] . But the estimation of the input parameters of the configuration become more difficult because parameters, such as E(X L (t)), MTTF, MTTR etc., are needed for such a FDS. We will introduce input parameter estimation shortly in Section 5. Note that for this configuration procedure, choosing a different message transmission protocol (e.g. TCP, UDP) can achieve different QoS for message communication. Thus, this new configuration can be more adaptive to the message transmission. For example, if the message loss probability or message delay is high for a certain protocol, then the FDS can switch to a more reliable protocol to achieve a better QoS without increasing the communication frequency or the timeout length.
Discussion
In Section 4.2 we introduced how to estimate the QoS bounds for a crash-recovery FDS based on the NFD-S algorithm. However, there are several facts which need to be taken into consideration.
In reality, the MTTF and MTTR are non-deterministic values, governed by random distributions. The proportion of detected failures is dependent on the probability distribution of X c (t), the length of η and timeout. If it is required to detect most failures before recovery, in practice η + timeout should be much smaller than MTTR. For example, for exponentially distributed
Theorem 4.1 gives the bounds of E(T MR ) and E(T M ). However, from Fig. 3 we can see that the characteristics of E(T MR ) and E(T M ) in the durations of
) are quite different. Estimating η and timeout using the mean of the dependability measurements might not satisfy the QoS requirement all the time. A stricter bound can be achieved by using the maximum value in the set {E(T M ), E(T M ), E(T M )}, which must be smaller than T U M and the minimum value in
, which is the fail-free duration, can be estimated by using the equation (3.3) of Theorem 5 in [3] . Thus
. Then the mistake duration within each MTBF can be as follows:
More strictly, E(T DR ) can be substituted by the maximum recovery detection time to have been recorded and E(T D ) can be substituted by T U D . For T MR , the possible mistake recurrence of the FDS is affected by the message delays, and losses, and the CR-TS's crashes and recoveries. The impact of the CR-TS's crash and recovery is governed by MTTF and MTTR, which mainly occur during[t 0 , t 1 ) and [t 2 , t 3 ). The impact of message delays and losses on T MR mainly happen within [t 1 , t 2 ). From the analysis of Theorem 4.1 in Section 4.2, we know that E(T MR ) ≥
MTTF−E(TDR) (
Therefore, E(T MR ) can be estimated by using the minimum value in the set {MTTF, E(T MR ), MTTR}. When
, the bound estimation of E(T MR ) can be reduced as follows:
Inequality (15) gives a stricter constraint for the QoS estimation. However, the drawback of this method is obvious. For a highly consistent CR-TS, due to small MTTR, T MR could be too small to satisfy a given QoS requirement. In this situation, using E(T MR ) instead could be a reasonable solution because the recovery of the CR-TS only happens once per MTBF period. Furthermore, if timeout is scaled up or even becomes larger than MTTR, from Theorem 4.1 we can know that the E(T MR ) can increase, but more failures will become undetectable. For such a highly consistent CR-TS, some new algorithm is needed to tackle this problem. 3 
Parameter Estimation
For a crash-recovery run, there are more input parameters than the fail-free run, e.g. parameters such as MTBF, MTTF, MTTR, p L , E(D) and E(X L (t)), are used for the FDS configuration. For such a crash-recovery FDS's configuration, the following strategies are used. During the first MTBF period (at the very beginning), we can assume that the QoS of the message communication is perfect (p L = 0, E(D) is small and E(X L (t)) = 0), and the CR-TS is failfree (MTTF → +∞). For the following MTBF periods, initially, the previous period's estimations can be used. As the monitoring procedure continues, the estimation of the QoS of the message communication and the dependability metrics of the CR-TS will become more and more accurate. Thus the FDS can be reconfigured to adapt to the changing input parameters achieving better η and timeout values. The following gives a brief description of how to estimate the FDS's inputs. QoS of Message Transmission Estimation: the estimation of p L and E(D) can proceed similarly to [3] . However the estimation of p L and E(D) should now be for each MTBF period. In addition, the average message losslength E(X L (t)) is used for the recovery detection speed E(T DR ) estimation. In our model, each message's transmission and loss behaviors are assumed to be independent (as in [3] ). Thus the mean number of consecutive message losses
Hence after arithmetic manipulation, it can be simplified to:
where m is the maximum number of consecutive messages lost and p L is the probability that each message is lost during the transmission. When m → +∞ and
If dependencies between message transmissions exist, then adopting the empirical probability distribution of X L (t) for estimation of E(X L (t)) is needed (c.f. [14] ).
Crash-Recovery Service's Dependability Metrics Estimation: let t 
Estimated MTTR: MTTR can be estimated directly using MTBF and MTTF: MTTR = MTBF − MTTF, or using t 
Estimated P r(X a (t) > τ i +x−t m r ): the probability that the CR-TS does not crash until τ i + x after its last recovery, can be estimated as follows:
When the probability density function f a (x) or distribution function F a (x) is unknown, an empirical distribution function (EDF) estimation can be adopted to estimate f a (x) or F a (x). Similarly, for P r(X c (t) > η+timeout) estimation, an empirical probability distribution can be used.
Simulation and Evaluation
For the simulation studies, we fix the heartbeat interval at η = 1 and increase the timeout length gradually. The message transmission parameters are p L =0.01, E(D) = 0.02, both exponentially distributed random variables. All of these settings are similar to the simulations in [3] . The CR-TS is defined as a recoverable process with various MTTF and MTTR as exponentially distributed random variables. We choose the exponential distribution for the nondeterministic MTTF and MTTR for the following reasons. First, exponential failures are widely adopted for reliability analysis in many practical systems; second, unlike some heavy tail distributions such as the log-normal distribution, crash and recovery with an exponential distribution will occur with reasonable inter-arrival times, avoiding the CR-TS behaving like a fail-free or crash-stop process. Furthermore, some reasonable durations of MTTF and MTTR are provided as simulation cases. Such crash-recovery targets are highly available and consistent, but not highly reliable, targets. We implement the revised NFD-S algorithm to evaluate the QoS of the algorithm. Figs. 5-7 demonstrate the algorithm from different perspectives. Fig. 5 shows that in a crash-recovery run, the mistakes caused by the CR-TS's crash and recovery have impact on E(T M ). For the same timeout length, there are four aspects which have impact on T M : the message delay and loss, the CR-TS's crash and recovery (see Fig. 2 ). T M caused by a message delay is governed by the ratio between E(D) and timeout. For the same E(D), as timeout increases, a larger delay can be tolerated. Thus T M caused by message delay (T 1 M ) will decrease and occur less frequently. T M caused by a message loss (T 2 M ) is related to η, p L , E(D) and the timeout length. For constant QoS of message communication (i.e. the same p L and E(D)), T M caused by message loss is governed by the ratio between η and timeout. Since as the timeout length increases more consecutive message losses can be tolerated, the average duration of T 2 M will decrease and T 2 M will occur less frequently. T M caused by a crash (T 3 M ) is mainly governed by the timeout length (see Fig. 2(c) ) and bounded by the CR-TS's recovery duration, because if a crash occurs, a false positive mistake will last until the failure detection time or until the CR-TS recovers. For detectable crashes, as the timeout length in-Overall, Fig. 5 shows that in a crash-recovery run, E(T M ) exhibits quite different characteristics from a failfree or crash-stop run. If the message delay and the probability of message loss are not very large, E(T M ) is bounded by MTTR. From Fig. 5 we also observe that E(T M ) can possibly be decreased when some timeout value is chosen. In a crash-recovery run, continually increasing the timeout length cannot achieve a better T M as in a fail-free run. Fig. 6 demonstrates the E(T MR ) of the NFD-S algorithm with exponential MTTF and MTTR with various values. We can see that as MTBF increases, for the same timeout length, E(T MR ) increases. This implies that E(T MR ) is greatly impacted by the dependability of the CR-TS. We can also see that, for both the simulation cases, E(T MR ) increases exponentially fast at the beginning but after E(T MR ) reaches MTBF 2 , it will stop increasing exponentially. If the CR-TS has a deterministic recovery duration, E(T MR ) will stop at MTBF 2 when failures are detectable. This is because when timeout + η is smaller than MTTR, all of the crashes are detectable. Even if all of the message delays and losses are tolerated, for every MTBF period there are still two mistakes (T within this period (see inequality (2) in Theorem 4.1). If timeout + η is larger than the recovery duration, all of the crashes might become undetectable. When mistakes caused by the message delays and message losses occur less frequently than the crash and recovery of the CR-TS, E(T MR ) will become stable at MTBF. In our simulation, the recovery duration of the CR-TS is an exponentially distributed random variable. Therefore, E(T MR ) will increase gradually and approach MTBF, rather than stop at MTBF 2 , until all of the crashes become undetectable since for nondeterministic recovery duration, as the timeout length increases, the proportion of the detectable crashes decreases. Notice that as the timeout length increases, E(R DF ) of the NFD-S algorithm decreases. When MTTR becomes shorter, E(R DF ) will decrease faster. This is because the smaller MTTR is, the faster timeout + η crosses MTTR (T U D > MTTR). Therefore, more crashes remain undetected. Thus we can conclude that NFD-S algorithm can achieve a weak completeness in a crash-recovery run. If a strong completeness is required for a crash-recovery failure detector, then new solutions are needed to achieve such a goal (see footnote 3).
Overall, from Figs. 5-7, we can see that, E(T MR ) and E(T M ) have bounds; continually increasing the timeout length might not be a reasonable way to achieve better P A , E(T MR ) and E(T M ). It might in fact decrease E(R DF ). A trade-off exists between the QoS metrics. For instance, according to our simulation settings, for the NFD-S algorithm, timeout ∈ [1, 1.1] (T U D = timeout + η ∈ [2, 2.1]) might achieve the best overall QoS for a highly available, highly consistent but not highly reliable CR-TS.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have extended previously proposed QoS metrics to adapt to the behavior of a crash-recovery target to measure the recovery detection speed and the completeness property of a failure detector. In addition to the QoS of message transmission, the dependability characteristics of the crash-recovery target are involved in the analysis of failure detector's QoS bounds. Our analysis results show that the QoS analysis in [3] is a particular case of a crashrecovery run. The dependability of the crash-recovery target could have significant impact on the QoS of a failure detector when the target is not fail-free or crash-stop. We have shown that when MTTF and MTTR do not approach infinity, the dependability metrics must also be used as inputs for the estimation of η and timeout, rather than only considering the impact of the liveness message transmission measurements (see Fig. 8 ). Furthermore we have given a method to estimate the FDS's parameters according to the QoS of message communication, the dependability of the CR-TS and the QoS requirements of the FDS based on Chen's NFD-S algorithm.
